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I. INTRODUCTION 
A central premise of international humanitarian law (IHL) is that the same rules apply 
to both parties in an armed conflict “regardless of the type of war they fight, the 
justness of their respective causes, or the disparities in power and capabilities between 
them.”1 In her essay, On a Differential Law of War, Gabriella Blum questions that 
premise, asking whether holding powerful parties to higher standards of IHL 
compliance than weaker parties might better maximize humanitarian welfare in 
conflict situations.2 Her answer is that the humanitarian effect of such “common-but-
differentiated responsibilities” (CDRs)—a term she borrows from international 
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environmental law (IEL) and international trade law (ITL)—is indeterminate because 
it depends on the nature of the CDR, the type of conflict, and whether the weaker 
party is a state or nonstate actor.3  
Blum’s normative analysis of the desirability of CDRs in IHL is exceptionally 
powerful, and I agree with most of her conclusions. This brief response, therefore, is 
intended to be more constructive than critical. In particular, I want to raise five issues 
that I believe warrant further exploration: (1) whether permitting judges to 
differentially apply IHL standards could be seen as legitimate; (2) whether 
proportionality is the kind of standard that permits differential application; (3) 
whether, and to what extent, CDRs would encourage states and nonstate actors to 
comply with IHL; (4) whether the case for CDRs might be stronger in non-
international armed conflict (NIAC) than in international armed conflict (IAC); and 
(5) whether it is possible to assess the humanitarian effect of CDRs without 
abandoning the jus ad bellum/jus in bello distinction. I conclude that, in fact, Blum’s 
own analysis supports recognizing at least one kind of CDR: namely, requiring strong 
states to spend more money than weak states on procuring and using precision 
weaponry. 
II. THE LEGITIMACY OF DIFFERENTIAL INTERPRETATION 
Blum identifies three ways in which CDRs could be incorporated into IHL. First, 
states could adopt a “differential legislative scheme” in which different sets of IHL 
rules would apply to strong parties and to weak parties. Parties to an armed conflict 
with air forces, for example, could specifically be prohibited from using aerial warfare 
against parties that either do not have their own air forces or lack the ability to defend 
against aerial attack.4 Second, prosecutors could treat members of strong parties more 
harshly than members of weak parties when deciding whether to pursue charges or 
particular sentences for criminal violations of IHL.5 Third, and finally, decision-
makers could apply the same rules of IHL to both strong and weak parties but 
interpret those rules differently depending upon whether a particular party is strong or 
weak. For example, “richer countries could be held to higher standards of medical 
evacuation and treatment of wounded combatants, or . . . richer countries could face 
greater restrictions on destruction of property for operational purposes.”6 
According to Blum, incorporating CDRs into IHL through differential interpretation 
of standards is “politically far more plausible” than adopting a differential legislative 
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scheme or a differential scheme of prosecutorial enforcement.7 I have no doubt that 
she is correct regarding the former: it is highly unlikely that strong states would ever 
either ratify a treaty that explicitly held them to higher standards of conduct than 
weaker states or permit the crystallization of customary rules to that effect. But I 
question whether differential interpretation of standards is actually more plausible 
than differential prosecutorial enforcement for one simple reason: discretion. 
International prosecutors have a great deal of discretion concerning whom to 
prosecute, what charges to bring, and what sentences to pursue.8 The exercise of that 
discretion is typically subject to only minimal judicial review. The International 
Criminal Court (ICC)’s Pre-Trial Chamber, for example, can prevent the Prosecutor 
from initiating a formal investigation into a situation only if there is no reasonable 
basis for that investigation or if the case does not fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.9 Similarly, it can prevent the Prosecutor from bringing charges against a 
particular suspect only if the case fails to satisfy the Rome Statute’s minimal gravity 
requirement10 or there are not “substantial grounds” to believe that the suspect is 
guilty of the charged crimes.11 The criteria international prosecutors use to make 
charging decisions are also anything but transparent, a fact that has been decried by 
numerous international criminal law (ICL) scholars.12 As a result, I think it is fair to 
say that a prosecutor who was committed to using her discretion to “discriminate 
against stronger parties when prosecuting or sentencing criminals” would have little 
trouble doing so.13 
By contrast, the decision-makers who would be responsible for differentially applying 
IHL standards—namely, judges of international courts and tribunals—do not enjoy 
the same kind of discretion. Judges, unlike prosecutors, have to give reasons for their 
                                                 
 
7 Id. at 188. 
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opacity of the decision-making process, any prosecutor worth her salt could easily justify 
treating members of strong parties to a conflict more harshly than members of weak parties 
without having to invoke the language of CDRs. Comparing the gravity of various crimes is a 
notoriously difficult task. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Situational Gravity Under the Rome Statute, in 
FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 227, 230–32 (Carsten Stahn & 
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decisions.14 That requirement would not prevent an enterprising judge at the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) or ICC from applying a rule differently depending 
on the power of the relevant party, but that judge would either have to pretend that 
she was not differentially applying the rule or would have to offer some principled 
rationale for doing so. The former method is at least arguably unethical, and the latter 
method seems inconsistent with the rule of law, whose basic command to decision-
makers is to treat like cases alike.15 There is nothing illegitimate about states legislating 
CDRs in the IHL context because states make international law.16 But courts are 
supposed to adjudicate, not legislate—even if we know that, in practice, they often do 
both.17 
Blum does not say whether she believes it would be legitimate for judges to 
differentially apply IHL standards. Indeed, she specifically “bracket[s] out” that 
issue.18 Such bracketing, however, seems inconsistent with Blum’s insistence that 
differential application of IHL standards is the most politically viable method of 
introducing CDRs into IHL. How could such CDRs be politically viable if they relied 
on judges openly acknowledging that they hold stronger and weaker participants in 
armed conflict to different standards of conduct? After all, as Blum notes, the 
“foundational principle”19 of IHL is equal application of the rules. 
Blum justifies bracketing out the legitimacy issue on the ground that she is interested 
solely in “the normative question” of whether CDRs are desirable in the IHL 
context.20 But the legitimacy of the process used to introduce CDRs into IHL is 
hardly a non-normative consideration. On the contrary, although instantiated through 
procedure, the idea that judges should adjudicate instead of legislate—should treat like 
cases alike—is itself normative. The question of whether it is normatively desirable to 
introduce CDRs into IHL through differential application of generally applicable rules 
can only be answered, therefore, by taking into account the normative costs of asking 
judges to assume a role that is fundamentally at odds with their professional function. 
                                                 
 
14 Article 74(5) of the Rome Statute, for example, provides that “[t]he decision shall be in 
writing and shall contain a full and reasoned statement of the Trial Chamber’s findings on the 
evidence and conclusions.” Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 74(5).  
15 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 156–57 (1961) (noting that “to apply a law 
justly to different cases is simply to take seriously the assertion that what is to be applied in 
different cases is the same general rule”). 
16 See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations, 285 RECUEIL 
DES COURS 9, 34 (2000). 
17 See, e.g., Allison Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the International Criminal Tribunals 
Recast the Law of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006). 
18 Blum, supra note 1, at 188. 
19 Id. at 168. 
20 Id. at 188. 
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III. DIFFERENTIALLY APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
I also believe that Blum overestimates the ability of judges to differentially apply some 
of the most important standards in IHL. Consider, for example, one of her two 
primary examples of a standard that could be applied differentially: the principle of 
proportionality. That principle prohibits military commanders from intentionally 
launching an attack “in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life 
or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.”21 Blum’s reliance on 
proportionality is intuitively attractive. As she points out, because “the application of 
the principle of proportionality is highly contingent on interpretation, context, and 
ultimately, the development of a sub-codex of rules for particular circumstances,” it is 
“susceptible to considerations of relative power, capabilities, and resources, all of 
which potentially affect the application of the standard to differently situated 
parties.”22 
Unfortunately, the differential application of the proportionality principle is defeated 
by the same indeterminacy that, in theory, makes such differential application 
possible. To permit the judicial creation of a CDR, the principle must be flexible 
enough to be “susceptible to considerations of relative power” yet determinate 
enough to permit judges to hold stronger and weaker parties to different 
proportionality standards. Consider Blum’s own example of a possible CDR, which 
she offers in her discussion of compliance with the rules of IHL: 
[A]ssume that weaker parties currently do not make any serious 
effort to minimize civilian casualties in their attacks, and that 
consequently, on average, attacks result in a 6:1 civilian to military 
casualty ratio (that is, six civilians killed for every enemy combatant 
killed). If a CDR gave weaker parties the ability to engage in attacks 
that yield a 4:1 ratio, even though this ratio would be illegal for 
stronger parties, the weak might be inclined to make some effort to 
comply.23 
The problem is that such fixed combatant/civilian ratios are incompatible with the 
principle of proportionality, which determines the acceptability of an attack by 
reference to the relationship between military advantage and civilian casualties, not by 
reference to the relationship between combatant casualties and civilian casualties. In 
                                                 
 
21 Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 8(2)(b)(iv). The test is somewhat different in Article 51 of 
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other words, the acceptable ratio of combatant casualties to civilian casualties fluctuates 
depending on the anticipated military advantage: a ratio that would be acceptable in 
the context of a critical attack might be criminal in the context of an attack that was 
less important. A workable proportionality CDR would thus require judges to 
differentially apply three different components of the proportionality standard: (1) the 
calculation of military advantage (permitting weaker parties to overestimate the 
anticipated advantage or requiring stronger parties to calculate the anticipated 
advantage more precisely), (2) the calculation of the incidental damage the attack 
would cause (permitting weaker parties to underestimate the anticipated damage or 
requiring stronger parties to estimate the anticipated damage more precisely), and (3) 
the comparison between the two (giving weaker parties more flexibility than stronger 
parties to determine when an attack would not be “clearly excessive”). 
 
Could judges fashion a workable CDR out of this multi-faceted proportionality test? I 
am dubious, given the indeterminacy of all three components—which Blum herself 
acknowledges. And that skepticism is based on treating the three components as 
objective, determining anticipated military advantage, anticipated incidental damage, and 
the relationship between the two from the perspective of the “reasonable military 
commander.”24 Most proportionality standards, however, determine whether an 
attack was disproportionate from the military commander’s subjective perspective. The 
Rome Statute, for example, only criminalizes attacks that the commander knew were 
clearly excessive; negligent calculation (of any of the components) is not enough.25 I 
fail to see how judges could fashion a workable CDR out of such a subjective 
proportionality standard, unless they simply decide to adopt a rebuttable presumption 
that the proportionality claims of weak military commanders are generally more 
credible than the proportionality claims of strong military commanders.26 That kind of 
differential credulity, however, hardly seems legitimate, for all of the reasons discussed 
in the previous section. 
 
                                                 
 
24 See ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 252 (2007) (noting that even the objective test does “not provide measurable 
ratios of military advantage and civilian damage that would be considered disproportionate”). 
25 See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Addendum Part II, Finalized Draft Text of 
the Elements of Crimes, Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Crim. Court, Mar. 13–31, June 12–
30, 2000, art. 8(2)(b)(iv), element 1, n.37, PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000) (providing 
that “this knowledge element requires that the perpetrator make the value judgement as 
described therein”). 
26 This is why Blum’s second example, the duty to take precautions, is a better candidate for 
a CDR: the extent of the duty is determined objectively, not subjectively. See Blum, supra note 
1, at 192–93. 
2011 / On a Differential Law of War: A Response 243 
 
 
 
There is a reason, in short, that “prosecutors have generally avoided pursuing cases of 
disproportionate targeting, preferring to focus instead on the deliberate or 
indiscriminate targeting of civilians”:27 the proportionality standard is so heavily 
skewed toward military commanders that only the most blatantly disproportionate 
attacks will ever run afoul of the prohibition.28 That fact, I think, dooms any attempt 
to create a proportionality-based CDR: an attack sufficiently disproportionate to 
violate the principle of proportionality would be sufficiently disproportionate under 
any interpretation of the proportionality standard. Holding weak and strong military 
commanders to different standards would thus have no practical effect. 
IV. OVERESTIMATING AND UNDERESTIMATING COMPLIANCE 
Blum argues that “the incentives to defect from humanitarian constraints would be 
more powerful than in other cooperative regimes,” such as IEL and ITL.29 She bases 
that argument on two considerations. First, noncompliance with environmental and 
trade agreements harms the defecting state because a “critical mass of compliance” is 
necessary to achieve the agreements’ intended benefits, such as reducing global 
warming or expanding the global marketplace.30 Compliance with IHL, by contrast, 
“does not necessarily contribute to a party’s own welfare,” because violating 
humanitarian rules can often increase that party’s ability to prevail in an armed 
conflict.31 Second, unlike IEL and ITL, which directly regulate only the actions of 
states, IHL also purports to bind nonstate actors, like rebel groups and terrorists. 
Such nonstate actors have little interest in complying with IHL, however, because the 
rules of IHL do not directly benefit them; unlike government forces, they do not 
possess combatant’s privilege and are not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war 
(POWs) upon capture. The disappearance of reciprocity from IHL also means that 
they can violate those rules without thereby permitting their state enemies to do the 
same.32 
Although I think Blum’s argument is generally correct, I have questions about both 
rationales. To begin, I think Blum overestimates the incentive for states to comply 
with environmental and trade agreements. There is no doubt, for example, that the 
failure to abide by IEL agreements limits the international community’s ability to slow 
down global warming. Yet that limitation has not prevented states—both developed 
                                                 
 
27 Id. at 190. 
28 See, e.g., Jessica C. Lawrence & Kevin Jon Heller, The First Ecocentric Environmental War 
Crime: The Limits of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 61, 83 
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30 See id. at 200. 
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and developing—from routinely violating the agreements or refusing to enter into 
them in the first place.33 Their unwillingness is unsurprising: after all, the dangers of 
global warming are both long-term and highly attenuated, two factors that limit the 
willingness of states to take those dangers into account when setting economic 
policy.34  
Conversely, I think Blum underestimates the incentive for states to comply with IHL 
agreements. As she acknowledges, a state that violates the rules of IHL is likely to 
discover that its enemy is willing to do the same.35 Reciprocity may no longer be 
required by IHL, but few states will sit idly by while opposing forces indiscriminately 
attack their civilian population or torture their POWs. Moreover, unlike the dangers 
of global warming or structurally inefficient global markets, the danger of retaliation 
for violations of IHL is both direct and immediate—precisely the kind of danger that 
a rational state will take into account when determining military policy. 
Blum is correct, of course, that nonstate actors have much less incentive to comply 
with IHL than states. Yet I believe she underestimates that incentive as well, 
particularly concerning rebel groups. First, rebel violations of IHL are particularly 
likely to lead to retaliation by the government—and that retaliation is particularly 
likely to involve significant violence. NIAC rarely attracts the same international 
scrutiny as IAC,36 which means that the reputational cost to a state for retaliatory 
violations of IHL, even particularly violent ones, will normally be much less in NIAC 
than in IAC. Second, as I have explained elsewhere in the context of the ICC,37 
because of the difficulties involved in investigating war crimes committed by state 
agents, international criminal tribunals have generally dedicated the lion’s share of 
their (meager) resources to investigating and prosecuting crimes committed by rebel 
groups. Rebels thus have far more reason than states to fear international prosecution 
for violations of IHL. 
Although Blum does not specifically address these incentives, she suggests that one 
way to encourage weaker parties in an armed conflict—including rebel groups—to 
comply with IHL would be to create “a scheme of CDRs that raise the bar for the 
more powerful but only on the condition that the weaker party complies with its own, 
                                                 
 
33 See, e.g., Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, A Framework for Analysis, in 
ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 1, 2–3 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobsen eds., First 
MIT Press Paperback ed. 2000). 
34 See generally PAUL EKINS, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY: 
THE PROSPECTS FOR GREEN GROWTH 242–82 (2000). 
35 See Blum, supra note 1, at 200 (noting that constraints on warfare are ultimately bilateral in 
application). 
36 There are exceptions, of course, such as the conflicts in Darfur and the Congo. 
37 See Heller, supra note 13, at 242. 
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relatively lower obligations.”38 That is a brilliant insight, even if the likelihood of 
strong states ever supporting such a scheme is vanishingly small. It is important to 
note, though, that we would have to push the notion of a CDR to its breaking point 
in order to provide rebel groups with an incentive to comply with IHL that is greater 
than the incentive created by the factors discussed above. The problem for rebels is 
not that the rules of IHL are too difficult for them to satisfy or too easy for the 
government to satisfy; the problem is that even perfect compliance with IHL does not 
insulate them from domestic prosecution. Truly incentivizing rebel groups to comply 
with IHL would thus require granting them belligerent status, which would entitle 
them to the combatant’s privilege and POW treatment upon capture. Unfortunately, 
states would be even more unlikely to accept that development than they would be to 
accept differential application of IHL standards to rebels and terrorists, even if there 
is precedent for it—the most obvious example being the Union’s willingness to grant 
de facto belligerent status to the Confederacy during the Civil War, an act that was 
specifically justified by humanitarian concerns.39 
V. CDRS IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 
Although Blum notes that her analysis of CDRs “is intended to be generic for all 
conflicts,”40 nearly all of her examples involve IAC. The lack of examples involving 
NIAC is unfortunate, not only because NIACs are now the rule rather than the 
exception,41 but also—and perhaps more importantly—because the various normative 
rationales for incorporating CDRs into IHL look very different when the weaker 
party to a conflict is a rebel group instead of another sovereign state. 
Consider, for example, the question of whether distributive concerns justify CDRs. 
Blum rightly emphasizes that CDRs are normatively appealing from the perspective 
of distributive justice42 because stronger parties are better able to comply with 
humanitarian obligations than weaker parties. For example, stronger parties can make 
use of more technologically advanced weapons whose precision minimizes incidental 
civilian casualties. Stronger parties also have a greater ability to “shift war onto the 
enemy’s territory so that the enemy’s civilians face greater perils than the powerful 
country’s nationals.”43 Those disparities are only magnified in NIAC: states are always 
richer and better equipped than rebel groups, and internecine warfare is almost always 
                                                 
 
38 Blum, supra note 1, at 205. 
39 See JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 68 (1926). 
40 Blum, supra note 1, at 195. 
41 See, e.g., J. William Futrell, Security Forces and International Treaties and Issues, SG056 ALI-ABA 
57, 71 (2002) (reporting that 97 of the 103 armed conflicts that took place between 1989 and 
1997 were non-international). 
42 “Distributive justice,” as Blum defines it, “seeks to reallocate resources in an equitable 
way.” Blum, supra note 1, at 181. 
43 Id. at 208. 
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fought in rebel, not government, territory. Moreover, unlike in IAC, the stronger 
party in NIAC, the government, owes moral obligations to the civilian population of 
the weaker party, the rebel group. After all, those civilians remain citizens of the state 
against whom the rebels are fighting. For both of those reasons, the distributive 
justice case for CDRs will normally be far stronger in NIAC than in IAC. 
The corrective justice44 case may be stronger still. Blum says that, in general, “[a]n 
argument about corrective justice is not easily transposable to the sphere of war.”45 
But that argument is quite easily transposed to NIAC. Many, if not most, 
insurrections result from the systematic oppression of minority groups by a 
government. Rebel activity in Darfur is an example. In such situations, the so-called 
“Pottery Barn” rule—the idea that the government has to take ownership of a 
harmful situation that it creates46—clearly justifies CDRs designed to “correct…these 
past injustices” by requiring the government to assume greater responsibility for the 
humanitarian welfare of the rebels’ threatened civilians.47 
VI. JUS AD BELLUM VS. JUS IN BELLO 
Blum states that, “in remaining loyal to the skepticism of IHL with regard to 
dependence on jus ad bellum,” she “ignore[s] the question of whether the parties are 
conducting a just or unjust war.”48 Her essay, however, indicates that her loyalty to 
that skepticism is divided at best. She openly acknowledges, for example, that there 
“may not be valid reasons to maintain that distinction” when considering the 
corrective justice rationale for enhanced obligations because identifying the “causes of 
suffering” sufficient to trigger the rationale “may be inextricable from the causes of 
the war and its justification.”49 Similarly, although the frequency with which states go 
to war is a jus ad bellum consideration, Blum accepts that incorporating CDRs into 
IHL will have a powerful effect on the utilitarian calculus that states utilize to 
determine whether they will use armed force: 
If CDRs raise the bar for stronger parties, these states may calculate 
the costs of war differently and exercise further caution against the 
use of military force to begin with; correspondingly, if soldiers and 
citizens of the more powerful party were aware of the increased 
burdens of war, they would be more hesitant to support their 
                                                 
 
44 Blum defines “corrective justice” as resting on “the idea that those who have contributed 
to causing harm must make amends to those who have suffered from it.” Id. at 183. 
45 Id. at 213. 
46 Expressed more colloquially as “you break it, you own it.” See id. at 214. 
47 Id. at 213. 
48 Id. at 197. 
49 Id. at 214–15. 
2011 / On a Differential Law of War: A Response 247 
 
 
 
government’s belligerent policy. At the same time, the greater 
constraints on stronger parties might encourage weaker parties, 
believing they stood a greater chance of success, to initiate conflicts, 
thereby increasing the overall incidence of violence.50 
To be clear, I come to praise Blum, not to bury her, for failing to consistently 
maintain the jus ad bellum/jus in bello distinction. Her essay stands as an eloquent 
indictment of that distinction because she demonstrates (intentionally or not) that it is 
impossible to normatively assess the obligations of the parties to an armed conflict 
without taking into account the comparative justness of their causes. I have already 
mentioned one example of that impossibility, the corrective justice rationale. Now 
consider the distributive justice rationale. Blum says—specifically addressing IAC—
that “[i]n transposing distributive justice arguments onto war, the question arises 
whether the general moral obligations that are owed by one society to another endure 
when the two societies are at war.”51 How can that question be answered without 
considering whether one party to the conflict is an aggressor and the other is simply 
defending itself? As far as I can tell, there is no coherent normative rationale for 
assuming that the mere act of State A using military force against State B—“mere” in 
the sense that we do not care why State A is using that force—frees State A of any 
and all moral obligations toward State B. Blum appears to agree with that 
conclusion.52 But if moral obligations survive the use of force, it seems absurd to 
determine the content of the two states’ IHL obligations without taking into account 
the fact that State A’s use of force, unlike State B’s, was inconsistent with the jus ad 
bellum. 
Indeed, Blum’s own analysis indicates why IHL cannot simply ignore jus ad bellum 
considerations. When discussing the relationship between democracy and 
“innocence,” for example, she argues that “[p]opular support—whether political, 
financial, or moral—of the government and armed forces may be enough in such 
cases to exemplify enmity and, by way of analogy from self-defense doctrines, would diminish 
any moral obligation to positively assist the civilian-attacker.”53 There is the jus ad 
bellum again—and rightfully so. Why would popular support for a government that is 
acting in self-defense diminish the obligations of the invading state to provide the 
invaded state’s civilian population with aid? Similarly, although Blum is no doubt 
correct that “[a]ny assistance during wartime allows the enemy power to free up 
resources for the war effort,”54 do we not care whether those additional resources will 
be used to resist aggression or to further it? Do we not want to limit the military 
power of aggressors while increasing the military power of the wrongfully invaded? 
                                                 
 
50 Id. at 204. 
51 Id. at 209. 
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248 Harvard International Law Journal Online / Vol. 52 
 
 
To be sure, none of these jus ad bellum considerations would justify adopting a CDR 
that held a wrongly attacked state to a lower standard of humanitarian protection than 
the state that wrongly attacked it. After all, the rationale for not requiring reciprocity 
in IHL is precisely that ordinary civilians and soldiers should not pay the price for 
their government’s misconduct.55 But Blum’s essay brilliantly demonstrates that 
permitting jus ad bellum considerations to affect the interpretation of jus in bello 
obligations does not have to result in the under-protection of civilians and soldiers. 
There is no reason, for example, why CDRs could not be imposed on a strong 
aggressive state that would hold it to a higher standard of humanitarian protection than 
IHL normally requires, whether by requiring the aggressive state to take greater 
precautions before launching attacks, requiring it to launch more precise attacks in 
general, or requiring it to provide greater humanitarian relief to its civilian victims. 56 
Such CDRs would help deter future wrongful attacks and maximize humanitarian 
welfare in invaded states without penalizing the aggressive state’s civilians and 
combatants for their government’s willingness to violate the jus ad bellum. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
If there is a normative argument against imposing CDRs requiring higher standards of 
humanitarian protection on strong aggressive states, I cannot find it. Nor can I find 
any compelling justification for not requiring stronger states in general—aggressive or 
non-aggressive—“to spend more money on the deployment, procurement, or 
development of better intelligence and more discriminating munitions.”57 Indeed, 
Blum seems to agree with at least the latter requirement: as she herself notes, such 
CDRs are supported by all four of the rationales discussed in the essay.58 
Which leads me to the closest thing I have to a genuine criticism of Blum’s 
remarkable essay: namely, that I find it difficult to understand why she is so reluctant 
to take a firm position on the normative desirability of CDRs. After all, Blum’s own 
analysis indicates that the case for at least one kind of CDR—the obligation of strong 
states to invest in more precise weaponry—is normatively overwhelming no matter 
what one’s politics. There is nothing even remotely “indeterminate” about the 
humanitarian impact of that CDR. So why not embrace it? 
                                                 
 
55 See, e.g., United States v. List (The Hostage Case), 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 757, 1247–
49 (1950). 
56 See Blum, supra note 1, at 208–09. 
57 Id. at 194. 
58 See id. at 179–81 (describing utilitarianism), 181–83 (describing distributive justice), 183–
84 (describing corrective justice), 184–85 (describing Samaritanism). 
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I recognize, of course, that openly advocating a “differential law of war” is fraught 
with political peril. All too often, such scholarship is used simply as a fancy pretext for 
either allowing Israel and the United States to launch disproportionate attacks against 
their enemies or allowing Palestinians and other oppressed groups to attack civilians 
or use human shields in “self-defense.” But that, in the end, is the greatest strength of 
Blum’s essay: she shows us how we can debate the normative desirability of CDRs 
without lapsing into debased political instrumentalism. 
